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Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. Belgarde, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe, et al., 
Respondents. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Brief for the Vie Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 
As Amicus Curiae 
Pursuant to Rule 42<2; of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, this brief is tiled 
pursuant to consent of the parties evidenced by letters 
of consent previous)v filed with the Clerk of thi* Court. 
Interest pf-A)iiicuf> Cunac 
Amicus Curiae the L'te Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation (herein referred to as the "Ute 
Tribe") is a iederallv recognized, self-sovernins Amer-
ican Indian Tribe organized oursuant to federal law 
and located on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in 
north-eastern Utah. 
Pursuant to authoritv granted bv its Tribal C-in-
stitution tsee 25 U.S.C. §476), the Vie Tribe has 
adopted a Law and Order Code which asserts juris-
diction in its Tribal Courts for all civil and criminal 
matters occurring within the exterior boundaries of the 
Tribe's Reservation whenever the action involves, 
"either the Tribe, its officers, agents, employees, 
property, or enterprises, or a u^Uiatr ui u.-e 
Tribe, or a member of a federally recognized 
tribe, . . . if the matter is . . . one in which the 
rights of the Tribe or its members may be di-
rectly or indirectly affected (Ute Law and 
Order Code, §1-2-5, adopted April 11. 1975; 
effective date. September 15, 1975). 
Such jurisdiction has been challenged generally by the 
State of Utah in a lawsuit now pending before the 
Utah Federal District Court. Such jurisdiction, inso-
far as it extends to non-Indians in criminal cases, has 
been specifically challenged by two non-Indians 
arrested by the Ute Tribe for trespassing on Tribal 
trust lands during the Fail 197C deer hunting season. 
These non-Indians have filed a petition for federal 
habeas corpus relief from Tribal Court jurisdiction in 
3 
the same Utah Federal District" Court,, which petition 
is now pending action by the Court. The issue of civil 
jurisdiction by the Ute Tribe over non-Indians was an 
underlying issue in the case of Brough v. Appawora. 
553 P.2d 934 (Utah S.Ct. 1976), recently vacated 
and remanded by order of this Court. See Appawora 
v. Brough, ...... U.S (52 L.Ed.2d 384), dated 
May 2, 1977. 
The Ute Tribe has an immediate and fundamental 
concern for the issues raised herein. This brief is sub-
mitted in support of the position taken by the appellee 
Suquamish Indian Tribe. 
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T 
The Ute Tribe believes that the majority opinion of 
U i C V_A> JT*. OT I ~ cL, 'vi2J> ^ * : . w \ i *_dx> |j-_v--'f.-wii\ c u » £ i i y i . v U l i l t ? 
issues presented herein and has reached the correct de-
cision in affirming the jurisdiction of the respondent In-
dian tribe over non-Indians for criminal conduct, occur-
ring on an Indian reservation, which affects the govern-
mental interests of the tribe and the peace and safety of 
its members. Such conclusion is correct both as to of-
fenses occurring on tribal ("trust") lands as well as on 
non-Indian roads and rights-of-way running through the 
reservation. 
The Ute Tribe believes that the doctrine of inher-
ent, residual tribal sovereignty provides the appropriate 
analytical context for deciding this case. Xo federal laws 
Ean be found which expressly remove jurisdiction over 
non-Indians from the realm of tribal sovereignty, and 
4 
established constructional canons relating to Indian leg-
islation should be applied to prevent the speculative or 
inferential expansion of federal criminal laws dealing 
with Indian reservations. Tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians has remained dormant as the result of adminis-
trative suppression, not its non-existence. Such jurisdic-
tion has not been lost by past non-user. Its exercise 
under conditions prevailing on most reservations has be-
come a practical necessity. 
Amicus curiae, The Ute Tribe, submits that the re-
cent cases of this Court provide a workable test to be 
applied in delineating the extent of Indian tribal crim-
inal jurisdiction over non-Indians. That test, in the 
nature of a "minimum contact" ^nalvsis. would permit 
Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians "insofar as concerns their transactions [and con-
duct] on a reservation with Indians [and recognized 
tribal interests, such as the peace, health, safety and wel-
fare of Indian communities]." Such test is found in this 
Court's characterization of the rule of Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217 (1959), contained in the case of United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 (1975). 
Argument 
I 
T H I S COURT H A S R E C O G N I Z E D T H A T 
T R I B A L COURT J U R I S D I C T I O N CAN 
P R O P E R L Y E X T E N D TO N O N - I N D I A N S 
I N R E L A T I O N TO T H E I R CONDUCT ON 
AN I N D I A N R E S E R V A T I O N W I T H I N -
D I A N S . 
y 
This courts opinion in United Slates v. Mazuric, 
419 U.S. 544 (1975), considered whether or not non-
Indian defendants could be prosecuted in federal court: 
under 18 U.S.C §1I(>1 for failing to comply with tribal 
alcoholic beverage licensing; regulations of the Wind 
River Tribes in Wyoming. In reply to the contention 
that it was unfair to subject the non-Indians to regula-
tion by a tribe, in whose government they could not, 
as non-Indians, participate, this Court replied as fol-
lows: 
The fact that the Mazuries could not become 
members of the tribe, and therefore could not 
participate in the tribal government, does not 
alter our conclusion. This claim, that because 
respondents are non-Indians Congress could not 
:A;D}cCi tricJi, to \zz ;i*uthcrity oi t^e Tn&al Coun-
cil with respect to the sale of liquor* is answered 
by this Court's opinion in Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S.Ct. 269 (J959). 
In holding that the autJierity of tribal courts 
could extend over non-Indians, insofar as con-
cerned their transactions on a reservation with 
Indians, wre stated: 
"It is immaterial that respondent is not an 
Indian. He was on the Reservation and the 
transaction with an Indian took place there. The 
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the 
authoritv of Indian governments over their 
reservations. Congress recognized this authority 
in the Navajos in the Treaty* of 1868, and has 
done so ever since. If this power is to be taken 
away from them, it is for Congress to do it. {419 
U.S. at 557-8} [Emphasis added.] 
The cited case of William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 
11959), has been characterized by this Court as a 
"landmark decision/' See McClanahan c. Arizona Tax 
Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). The McClana-
han case quotes with approval the following from Wil-
liams v. Lee, ielating directly to the issue of Indian 
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians here-
in: 
Over the years this Court has modified [the 
tribal sovereignty principle] in cases where essen-
tial tribal relations were not involved and where 
the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized 
. . . Thus, suits by Indians against outsiders in 
state courts have been sanctioned . . . And state 
courts have been allowed to try n on-Indians who 
committed crimes against each other on a reserv-
ation . . • But if the crime teas by or a^iiim an 
Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly con-
ferred on other courts by Congress has remained 
exclusive. . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts 
of Congress, the question has always been 
whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and 
be ruled by them." {McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 
171-2, quoting from Williams v. Lee, 3.38 U.S. 
at 219-20) [Emphasis added.] 
While the McClanahan and Williams cases dealt 
with state taxation and state court civil jurisdiction over 
reservation Indians, respectively, it is significant that 
both cases have restated that "crimes bv or against an 
Indian" are to be handled in either tribal or federal 
courts. In order for the phrase "against an Indian" to 
be meaningful, it must include offenses by a non-Indian 
against an Indian, since offenses "bv an Indian" against 
another Indian would alreadv be covered under the 
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category of offenses "bv . . . an'Indian", ihe oniv ex-
ception to tlie exclusive tribal-federal court jurisdiction 
would be offenses bv a non-Indian against a non-
Indian; the other combinations, Indian against Indian, 
Indian against non-Indian, and non-Indian against In-
dian, all come within the phrase "by or against an In-
dian" for which tribal jurisdiction is exclusive absent 
an express Congressional delegation to another forum. 
Such an analysis is consistent with the characterization 
of the Williams v. Lee rule contained in United States 
v. Mazurie, supra, 419 U.S. at 5.58: 
that the authority of tribal courts would extend 
over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their 
transactions on a reservation with Indians. 
W e submit that this last stated formulation pro-
vides a reasonable test and standard to be applied in 
defining the limits of tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indians. I t wrould exempt from tribal court jurisdiction 
conduct in which the Indians or their tribe have no 
particular concern (e.g., crimes involving only non-
Indians), while allowing Indian tribes to exercise gov-
ernmental powers in matters involving members of the 
tribe and threats to the property, peace, health, safety, 
and welfare of the tribe and its members. As noted 
above under "Interest of Amicus Curiae/' this is the 
jiirisdich'onal approach which the Ute Tribe, amicus 
curiae hereof, has taken. 
Such a standard can be reasonably analogized to 
established bases for finding jurisdiction in other con-
texts. For example, can it not be said that the act of 
s 
committing an offense against an Indian on a ref-erv-
ation or committing a breach of the .peace or other dis-
ruptive conduct within an Indian reservation consti-
tutes sufficient: 
minimum contacts with [the tribe] such that die 
maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fcvir play j.nd substantial jus-
tice" (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 314 316 (1945)? 
This standard ("transactions on a reservation with 
Indians"), though necessarily general in its pronounce-
ment, can be refined and applied to die specific circum-
stances of each case by the judges, both tribal and 
otherwise, to whom the question is presented. Con-
gress has imposed upon tribal courts the federal stand-
ards of both due process of law and equal protection 
of the laws, as well as specific re^uieiions Eclating io 
criminal procedures. See 25 U.S.C. §1302. Habeas 
corpus relief is available in federal courts to test the 
procedures of the tribal courts as applied to both In-
dians and non-Indians. See 25 U.S.C. §1303. Such 
protections extend to "persons," not merely to "Indians." 
See Point I I I herein below. 
Certainly under the operative facts in the instant 
case it cannot be said to be unfair or unjust to subject 
Mr. Oliphant to tribal prosecution for his assaulting 
tribal police officers on Indian trast property during a 
tribal celebration. Likewise, in the case of Mr. Bel-
garde, it cannot be said to be unfair or unjust to subject 
him to tribal prosecution after he had been racing reck-
9 
lessly through the streets of ai, .ludiyj cn-inunity, witli 
tribal officers in pursuit for several hours. Such con-
tacts are far more than minimal; they are recognized 
as breaches of the peace under any standard of law. 
Is it any less fair to apply the standards which govern 
Indian conduct off a reservation to non-Indian conduct 
on a reservation? 
Absent express federal laws to the contrary, In-
dians going beyond reservation boundaries have 
generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory 
state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of 
the state. Mescalero Apaclie Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145, 148-9 (1973). 
The concept of residual, inherent sovereignty pro-
vides the theoretical basis for tribal court jurisdiction 
over non-Indians (see Point I I I below); the recent de-
cisions of this Court vyro^e 4he luck'cial precedent for 
extending such jurisdiction to criminal as well as civil 
actions. The repeated recognition of the "right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled 
by them" (William v. Lee, supra, 358 U.S. at 220) 
recognizes this power as a sovereign right one which, if 
enforceable only against a portion of those who would 
break tribal laws, would be an empty right indeed. For 
if "self-determination" and "internal sovereignty" are to 
have any meaning, they must include the power to pre-
serve the peace and order of the society possessing 
these powers. As in the case of other sovereignties, 
such as the States: 
The power and duty of the State to take ade-
quate steps to preserve the peace and to protect 
iO 
the privacy, the lives, and the property of its 
residents cannot be doubted. ( Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940)). 
This concept was recognized by the Court of Appeals 
below when it observed that: 
Surely the power to preserve order on the reserv-
ation, when necessary by punishing those who 
violate tribal law, is a sine qua non of the sov-
ereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed. 
Oliphant v. Schlie, 5U F.2d 1007,' 1009 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
To deny such fundamental attributes of sovereignty 
to Indian tribes would be to render their sovereignty 
meaningless, placing them at the mercy of persons 
whom they cannot control, having to look for protection 
from federal officials ->vho c£en display indifference in 
becoming involved in another petty "Indian" case. For 
many Indian reservations, it is unfortunately still true 
in large measure as it was in the last century, that: 
They [the Indian tribes] owe no allegiance to 
the States, and receive from them no protection. 
Because of local ill feeling, the people of the 
States where they are found are often their dead-
liest enemies. United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S. 375, 385 (1886). 
Effective law enforcement by federal officials is 
virtually non-existent on most Indian reservations. Fed-
eral investigate, prosecutorial and judicial authorities 
are generally far removed from Indian reservations, 
both physically and culturally. It is virtually impossible 
for most tribes to obtain federal prosecution of the 
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multitude of relatively minor, vet socially disruptive of-
fenses, such as those committed by Messrs. Oliphant 
and Belgarde. As a practical matter, if the Indian tribes 
are held to have no jur.vliction over such offenses by 
non-Indians, the reservations will be converted from 
reserves for the benefit of the Indians to havens for the 
lawless among the whites. Such a result is inconsistent 
with Congressional policy, concepts of federal guardian-
ship, and the precedents of this Court which "have 
consistendy guarded the authority of Indian govern-
ments over their reservations." (Williams v. Lee, supra, 
358 U.S. at 223). 
I I 
T H E O F F E N S E S O C C U R R E D W I T H I N 
I N D I A N COUNT!**" A N D A K E x 'KuP-
E R L Y W I T H I N T R I B A L J U R I S D I C T I O N 
The authority of an Indian tribe inhabiting an In-
dian resenation is geographically coextensive with the 
boundaries of that reservation, regardless of the own-
ership status of lands therein. Just as a state may de-
fine offenses occurring on private roads or other prop-
erty within its boundaries, so may an Indian tribe. 
I t is the existence of an exterior leservation boundary 
that defines the territorial extent of tribal jurisdiction, 
not the tide status of each parcel of property therein. 
Such an approach is not only consistent with com-
mon sense, but with federal law as well. 18 U.S.C. 
§1151 defines "Indian Country" as follows: 
12 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 11.3-1 
and 115G of this tide, the term "Indian country", 
as used in this chapter, means (a) ail land with-
in the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, 
netwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian commun-
ities within the borders of the United States 
whether within the the original or subsequently 
acquired territory thereof, and whether within 
or without the limits of a state, and (c) all In-
dian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way 
running through the same. [Emphasis added.] 
As noted in this Court's opinion in DeCoteau v. Dis-
trict County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975): 
If the lands in question are within a continuing 
"reservation," jurisdiction is in the tribe and the 
Federal Government "notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, [such jurisdiction] including 
rghits-of-way running through the reservation." 
18 U.S.C. §1151 (a) . . . While §1151 is con-
cerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdic-
tion, the Court has recognized that it generally 
applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. 
Thus, the concept of "Indian country" as defined 
in 18 U.S.C. §1151 is definitive of the territorial extent 
of Indian tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction. There 
can be no reasonable question that Mr. Oliphant's al-
leged criminal conduct occurred within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Suquarnish Tribe, as his offense oc-
curred on Tribal lands (lands held in trust for the 
Tribe bv the United States). Mr. Bel garde's offense 
)5 
occurred on a state highway and a count)- load within 
the exterior boundaries of the Tribe's recognized reserv-
ation. As developed above, such "rights-of-way" are a 
part of "Indian country" and within the territorial juris-
diction of the Tribe. As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has previously held in a case involving the 
authority of a tribal officer to stop and search a vehicle 
on a state highway running through an Indian reserv-
ation : 
[ W ] e note that the fact that the events of in-
terest here may have occurred within the right-
of-way for a state highway avails the defendant 
nothing. .Rights of way running through a 
reservation remain part of the reservation and 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribal 
police. See, Gc-mecu v. S^n'iK 207 N . W ?d 
256 (NJDaL 1973); 18 U.S.C. §1151 (1970). 
Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 
1180 (9th Cir. 1975). 
I l l 
T H E (COURT O F A P P E A L S ' R E S I D U A L 
S O V E R E I G N T Y A N A L Y S I S IS C O N S I S T -
E N T W I T H E X I S T I N G L A W 
The long-standing decisions of this Court recog-
nizing Indian tribal sovereignty have received recent 
reaffirmation. In declaring the inability of states to 
collect taxes on Indian Income earned on a reservation, 
this Court has declared as follows: 
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, 
then, not because it provides a definitive resolu-
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tion of the issues in this suit, but because it pro-
vides a backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes must be read. I t 
must always be remembered that the various 
Indian tribes were once independent and sov-
ereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty 
long predates that of our own Government . . . 
But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the 
last century, that ~[t]he relation of the Indian 
tribes living within the borders of the United 
States . . . [is] an anomalous one and of a com-
plex character . . . They were, and always have 
been, regarded as having a semi-independent 
position when they preserved their tribal rela-
tions; not as SLties, zoi as -.:Mz^$9 not o^ pos-
sessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but 
as a separate people, with the power of regulat-
ing their internal and social relations, and thus 
far not brought under the laws of the Union or 
of the State within whose limits they resided." 
United States v. Kagima, 118 U.S., at 381-882, 
30 L.Ed. 228. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax 
Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172-3 (1973) [Em-
phasis added.] 
See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 
(1975). 
The dissent in the Olipliant opinion characterizes 
tribal "sovereignty" as "merely a veil used where the 
issue is, in fact, one of federal preemption of regula-
tion in the field of Indian affairs.*' (Oliphant, supra, 
544 F.2d at 1015). H e has confused the "backdrop* 
referred to in McClnnahan, supra, which set the stage 
for consideration and provides a point of reference from 
which to begin analysis, with the curtain ("veil") which 
obscures the stage from view. Tribal sovereigntv is far 
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more than a mere analytical tool; it is a venerable doc-
trine fundamental to the entire field of Indian: law. 
As one example of how tribal sovereignty con-
tinues as a vital precept of Indian law, we cite the fol-
lowing as indicative of its pervasive and fundamental 
nature. Very recently, this Court has reconfirmed that 
Indian tribes possess sufficient sovereignty to immunize 
them from unconsented suite in state courts. See Puy-
allup Tribe v. Department of Game, . U.S (45 
U.S.L.W. 4837, June 23, 1977) citing United States 
v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 
506 (1939). 
Congress has likewise recently recognized that such 
sovereign rnimmiiiy is an inherent and residual char-
acteristic of Indian tribes. See 25 U.S.C. §450n: 
Nothing in this Act [the Indian Self-Deter-
mination and Education Assistance Act of 1975] 
shall be construed as—(1) affecting, modifying, 
diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign 
immunity from suit enjoyed by an Indian 
t r i be ; . . . 
Sovereign immunity for Indian tribes is a residual con-
cept; the tribes are immune from suit because they were 
originally so as sovereign entities and this attribute of 
sovereignty has and will continue, until modified by the 
Congress on behalf of the now dominant sovereign, the 
United States. 25 U.S.C. §450n does not grant sov-
ereign immunity, it recognizes it as already existing. 
This Indian Self-Determination and Education As-
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sistance Act of 1975 (25 U.S.C. §150 ct scq.) provides 
additional L. sights into the residua] [ndian sovereignty 
concept Given Congress' recognized plenary authority 
over Indian affairs (see, e.g., Winton v. Amos, 255 
U.S. 373, 391 (1921), and Delaiiare Tribal Business 
Coram, v. Weeks, U.S (51 L.Ed. 2d 173, 182-
3) (1977)), the recent considered findings and pro-
nouncements of the Congress should be entitled to seri-
/ous consideration. The "Congressional statement of 
findings" accompanying this 1975 Act is instructive in 
several particulars relevant hereto. 
. • _ •••-» ' . > * . v i - O 
Federal Government's historical and special legal 
relationship with, and resulting responsibilities 
to, American Indian people, finds that— 
(1) the prolonged Federal domination of 
Indian service programs Las served to retard 
rather than enhance the progress of Indian 
people and their communities hy depriving 
Indians* of the full opportunity to develop 
leadership skills crucial to the realization of 
self-government, and has denied to the Indian 
people an effective voice in the planning and 
implementation of programs for the benefit of 
Indians which are responsive to the true needs 
of Indian communities: and 
(2) the Indian people a ill nez.r surrender 
their desire to control their relationship both 
among themselves and iviih non-Indian gov-
ernments, organizations, end persons. (25 
U.S.C. §450) [Emphasis added.] 
Xot only has the Congress recognized the existence of 
a. continuing Indian "desire' to' control relationships 
witth "non-Indian perse is/* but such desire is linked 
to the concept of self-government and self-determina-
tion. The following section of this 1975 Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§150a, contains a "Congressional declaration of policy" 
which states, amon? other things, that, "The Congress 
hereby recognizes the obligation of the ITnited States 
to respond to the strong expression of die Indian people 
for self-determination . . ." (25 U.S.C. §450a(a)). 
The question of "The status of Indian tribes" has 
been used by this Court as a recognized example of a 
non-judicially reviewable pob'tical question. See Baker 
a Cart, 389 U.S. 186, 215-6 (1962). See also, e.g., 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
The Indian Self-Determination and Educational As-
affirmation of residual tribal sovereignty as an attribute 
of Indian tribal status. Prior acts, relating to Indians 
generally, have been similarly framed. See, e.g., Sec-
tion 16 of the Indian Reorganization (or Wheeler-
Howard) Act of June 18, 1934 dealing with the "Or-
ganization of Indian Tribes": " . . . In addition to all 
powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by 
existing law, . . / ' (25 U.S.C. §476) 
The more recent so-called Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968 (25 U.S.C. §§1301-1803, especially 1302) pro-
vides an interesting contrast to dissenting Judge Ken-
nedv's analvsis of 18 U.S.C. §§11.52 and 1153. He rea-
sons that because these earlier acts specifically refer to 
"Indians" in defining their scope and limits, that Con-
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gress must have assumed that tribal courts could not 
exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian*. See Olipliant, 
supra, 544 F.2d at 1015-1018. By contrast, both of 
sections 1302 and 1303 of Title 25, United States Code, 
refer to the rights of "persons" as opposed to "Indians" 
in reference to official actions by Indian tribes. For 
example, 25 U.S.C. §1303 provides; 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
be available to any person, in a court of the 
United States, to test the legality of his deten-
tion by order of an Indian tribe. [Emphasis 
added.] 
25 U.S.C. §1302 spells out constitutional type rights as 
limitations on the powers of Indian tribes: 
Xo Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-gov-
ernment shall: 
(3) subject any person for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy; 
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself; 
(5) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding 
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of its laws or deprive any 
person of liberty or property7 without due pro-
cess of law; 
* * * 
^10) deny to any parson accused of an offense 
iy 
punishable bv imprisonment the rij^ht, upon re-
quest io a trial by jury of not less than six 
persons. 
As recently as 19CS, Congress has, by this Act, recog-
nized that tlie "powers of self-government" of an Indian 
tribe can extend to "any person" and that such "per-
sons'* are protected in numerous areas exclusively and 
expressly related to criminal procedures. The cases 
which have considered the applicability of the protec-
tions of the Indian Civil Rights Act to non-Indians 
have found them to apply, noting thai the substitute 
bill which was offered (in the basic form subsequently 
enacted), had originally referred to "American Indians'9 
in delineating the beneficiaries of the rights to be estab-
lished. This phrase was dropped in a later revision of 
the substitute bill which substituted the phrase "any 
i>d\>C/-ii j.or -^-jLiJucrjGari xi^ijuxin, WILR tu.e ixi ie/u to estao-
lish rights for all persons who may be subject to the 
jurisdiction of tribal governments, whether Indians or 
non-Indians" (Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F.Supp. 17, 24 
(D.Ariz. 1968)). See also Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. 
United States, 515 F.2d 926, 934 n.8 (10th Cir. 1975); 
Schantz v. White Lightning, 302 F.2d 67, 70 n.5 (8th 
Cir. 1974); Hickey c. Crow Creek Housing Authority, 
379 F.Supp. 1002 (D.S.Dak. 1974). W e submit that 
as has been held in affirming certain implied powers 
of the United States, the imposition of a limitation on a 
power is "but an implied assertion" of the existence of 
the power. See, e.g., Kohl r. United States, 91 U.S. 
367, 371-72 (1876/ regarding the power of eminent 
domain as implied from the Fifth Amendment limita-
tion thereon regarding the payment of just compensa-
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tibn. Congress has impliedly :c;c :uized the existence 
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians by im-
posing limitations on the criminal procedures which 
can be applied to non-Indians and providing them with 
a federal habeas corpus remedy to test "the legality of 
their detention" under Trihrd jurisdiction. 
Indeed, this-Court has recently considered the leg-
islative intent behind 18 U.S.C. 1153 and concluded as 
follows: 
In short, Congress extended federal jurisdic-
tion to crimes committed by Indians on Indian 
land out of a conviction that many Indians would 
"be civilized a great deal sooner by being put 
under [federal criminal] laws and taught to re-
gard life and the oersonsl property of others." 
That is emphaUcaUy not to say, however, that 
Congress intended to deprive Indian defendants 
of procedural rights guaranteed to other defend-
ants Keeble tx United States, 412 U.S. 205, 
211-12 (1973). 
The majority opinion's concluding paragraph in Keeble 
expressly recognizes tribal criminal jurisdiction as an 
inherent, residual concept: 
Finally, we emphasize that our decision today 
neither expands the reach of the Major Crimes 
Act nor permits the government to infringe the 
residual jurisdiction of a tribe by bringing prose-
cutions in federal court that are not authorized 
by statute. Id at 214. [Emphasis added.] 
In a subsequent case considering the history of 18 
U.S.C. §1153, this Court notes the position of the 
:i 
.United States regard in <: the Con_::ec>;"}n^] intent of' ihe 
Jtfaior Cricnes Act:' 
[Tjhe Government [in Kccblc] has charac-
terized the Major Crimes Act as "a carefully 
lirn[Uj_ intrusion of federal power into the other-
w^elnvcTusiv;e.^ of the Indian bibes to 
punish Indians for cringes committed on Indian 
h:^s. CrAicd States v. Ar.icL->ve, l \ S 
(51 L.Ed.2d 701, 705 n.l) (1977). 
Such limited Concessional intent should not be 
broadly expanded to include limitations on jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, particulirly in light of the "eminently 
sound and vital canon* which requires that "statutes 
passed for the benefit ofTndians are to be liberally con-
strued and all doubts are to be resolved in their favor." 
See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. HoUowbrebst, 425 
U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976). 
- * i / • • » . .
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ceived contiriiied recognition from the Executive branch 
of the Federal Government as well. In an opinion en-
titled "Powers of Indian T;:bes," dated October 2 5, 
1i?3t. isttd bv the Solid Mr of the Dcnci ;T;,ent of the 
Interior in response to on-scions regarding the meaning 
f . l 1 ** i 1 • T J • • »t • 
tne phrr.se powers vested i.i any Ja :"n ^:oe or 
tribal council by exiting 'aw" Lund in Sec Lion 13 of 
the Indian Reor^ani^tbn -'or \VLeTer-ILw a ^ Act 
of 1534 (43 Slat ??4. c-7: 25 LhS C. 1^76). the 
Solicitor states as fellows: 
Pe/haps the nv^t -coo principle of all I n o - a 
lane supported bv a l o c of d•/••:•••-ion? hcreina'Ur 
analyzed. :s t -:• pnn cop.:- \oat * -<: p.-n-c-s c c . ? 
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are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, 
in acnerd, delegated powers granted by express 
acts of Congress, but rather inlierent powers of 
a limited sovereignty which lias never been ex-
tinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its relation-
ship with the Federal Government as a sovereign 
power, recognized as such in treaty and legisla-
tion. The powers of sovereignty have been lim-
ited from time to time by special treaties and 
laws designed to take from the Indian tribes 
control of matters which, in the judgment of 
Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely 
permitted to handle. The statutes of Congress, 
then, must be examined to determine the limit-
ations of tribal sovereignty rather than to deter-
mine its sources or its positive content What is 
not expressly limited remains within the domain 
of tribal sovereignty, and therefore properly fails 
within the. statutory category, "powers vested in 
any InJian tribe or enbal council by cicsiiiig 
law." 
The acts of Congress which appear to limit 
the powers of an Iridian tribe are not to be un-
duly extended by doubtful inference. (55 I .D. 
14, 19) [First emphasis in the opinion; others 
added.] 
Accord, see Felix S. Cohen's, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, p. 122 (1942) and the United States De-
partment of the Interior's Federal Indian La-v, pp. 
395-6 (195S). 
Each coordinate branch of the Federal Govern-
ment has recognized the existence :>f inherent tribal 
sovereignty as an historical fact which enjoys continu-
ing validity. The Court of Aopeais and the District 
Court below •h1i\c> ..-.rreciiv p'emivi-d tbc?r analysis oi 
the issues herein on. the e\is':ence' of such tribal sov-
ereignty. 
IV 
PAST F A I L U R E TO E X E R C I S E J U R I S -
DICTION OVER X O X - I X D I A X S H A S 
XOT R E S U L T E D IX T H E LOSS O F IX-
H E R E X T TRIBAL S O V E R E I G N POW-
ERS R E L A T I X G T H E R E T O 
In the opinion entitled "Powers of Indian Tribes", 
supray issued shortly after passage of the Indian Re-
organization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, Depart-
ment of the Interior Solicitor MarsoJd stated as follows 
regarding the vitality of the Sovereign powers of In-
dian tribes which had not theretofore been exercised: 
It is a fact that State governments and ad-
ministrative officials have frequently trespassed 
upon the realm of tribal autonomy, presuming to 
govern the Indian tribes through State law or 
departmental regulation or arbitrary administra-
tive fiat, but these trespasses have not impaired 
the vested legal powers of local self-government 
which have been recognized again and again 
when these trespasses have been challenged by 
an Indian tribe. "Power and authority rightfully 
conferred do not necessarily cease to exist in 
consequence of lone nonuser." • United States 
ex rel. Stand in z Bear t\ Crock. .5 Dill. 4.53, 460). 
The Wheeler-Howard Ac t bv affording statu-
tory recognition of these powers of local self-gov-
ernment and administrative assistance in de-
veloping adequate mechanisms for such govern-
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ment may reasonably he expected to end the 
conditions that hrr t- in the pist led the Interior 
Department and virions State agencies to deal 
with matters that -.re properly within the legal 
competence of the Indian t: ibes themselves. (o5 
I.D. 14,23-29 H9%i> >. 
See also KoM tv United States, supra, 91 U.S. at 73: 
" [T]he non-user of a power does ?jot disprove its exist-
ence/' 
It has onlv been within the last few vears that 
the prediction of Sohcitor Margold has been partially 
realized with the approval by the Secretary of the In-
terior of Indian tribal codes asserting both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian 
reservations and in situations Involving Indian interests. 
Congress, in which resides plenary authority over the 
subject matter, by such acts as the Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 and the Indian Seif-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975, has provided both 
implied and express recognition of, and support for, 
tribal sovereignty, including criminaJ jurisdiction over 
non-Indians "insofar as concern[s] their transactions on 
a reservation with Indians" < United States t*. Mazurie, 
supra, 419 U.S. at 558). 
CONCLUSION 
Amicus curiae The Ute Indian Tribe sub.nits that 
the Court of -Appeals has properlv analvzed ctnd ap-
propriately affirmed the jurisdiction of the Siiquamish 
Tribe over appellants for the criminal offenses com-
25 
littecl by them 'w:\hiii that Tribe's reservation':" The 
decision of the Court of Appeals should he affirmed. 
Respectful!} submitted this 28th dav of October 
1977. 
Stephen G. Bo) den 
Scott C. Pugslev 
Attorneys for the Ute Indian Tribe, 
Amicus Curiae 
